

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01497 01 OF 02 121308Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----121312Z 036054 /44

O 121135Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4652
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1497

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, XA, TZ, RH
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NYERERE'S COMMENTS ON UK FOREIGN
SECRETARY OWEN'S PRESENTATION ON RHODESIA

REF: A) STATE 80483, B) DAR ES SALAAM 1485

1. SUJMARY. NYERERE APRIL 12 CONFIRMS THAT OWEN PROPOSAL
ON RHODESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
HIS THINKING AND IS "WAY TO PROCEED NOW". NYERERE EMPHASIZES
IMPORTANCE OF US POWER IN ACHIEVING SUCCESS WITH APPROACH
AND SPECULATES ON HOW IT MIGHT BE USED. HOWEVER, HE RAISES
QUESTION OF DESIRABILITY US FORMAL PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCE.
END SUMMARY.

2. IN HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE MID-DAY APRIL
12, I PRESENTED US POSITION IN SUPPORT OWEN'S PROPOSAL PER
REF A. NYERERE'S RESPONSE WAS THAT OWEN'S IDEA OF A CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONFERENCE IS "BEST WAY TO PROCEED NOW". NYERERE REVIEWED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 01497 01 OF 02 121308Z

AGAIN, AS HE SAID HE HAD FOR OWEN, HIS OWN HISTORY REGARDING UK
ACTION OF THIS KIND, AND ENDED BY SAYING HE HAD TOLD OWEN: "WHEN
YOU ARE READY, GO AHEAD. IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU IF SMITH
ATTENDS. BUT, IF HE DOESN'T, GO AHEAD ANY WAY. GET A TIMETABLE
SETTLED; AND THEN WE WILL WORK OUT HOW TO IMPLEMENT."

3. NYERERE INDICATED THAT: (A) HE DID NOT THINK SMITH WOULD IN

FACT ATTEND, (B) HE DID BELIEVE AT MOMENT THAT OWEN WOULD GO AHEAD WITH CONFERENCE EVEN WITHOUT SMITH, (C) BURDEN OF IMPLEMENTATION (WHICH HE STILL DESCRIBED AS SIMPLY "GETTING SMITH OUT") WOULD FALL HEAVILY ON US BECAUSE UK PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE THE WILL TO CARRY THROUGH. NYERERE WAS CONVINCED THAT IN CONTRAST TO SITUATION IN 1965 WHEN LANDING OF A FEW BATTALIONS OF BRITISH TROOPS IN RHODESIA WOULD HAVE CAUSED MANY ELEMENTS TO UNITE AGAINST THEM, A SIMILAR LANDING NOW -- ESPECIALLY IF IT HAD US SUPPORT -- WOULD CAUSE ALL ELEMENTS, EXCEPT SMITH, TO RALLY TO THEM. THIS WAS A RISK THAT UK SHOULD AND COULD TAKE BUT OWEN HAD TOLD NYERERE IT WOULD NOT, SO, NYERERE SAID, THE US WOULD HAVE TO FACE UP TO HOW IT COULD USE ITS POWER TO ACHIEVE IMPLEMENTATION -- WHICH, HE REPEATED, IS REALLY NOTHING MORE THAN FINDING A WAY TO GET RID OF SMITH. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE LANDING OF "A FEW BATTALIONS" WAS THE ONLY WAY TO DO THIS, HE SAID IT WAS PROBABLY THE SUREST BUT IF SOMEONE COULD DEVISE ANOTHER, FINE.

4. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THE US ROLE, NYERERE SAID HE WANTED TO SAY SOMETHING THAT HE HAD NOT REPORTED TO OWEN. THE BRITISH WERE TYING TWO THINGS TOGETHER: (A) FORMALLY INVOLVING US IN CONFERENCE, AND (B) THE APPLICATION OF AMERICAN POWER TO THE SITUATION. NYERERE BELIEVED THE LATTER WAS ESSENTIAL BUT THOUGHT THAT THE FORMER MIGHT RAISE PROBLEMS. HE KNEW WHAT MUGABE HAD SAID ABOUT THIS QUESTION (REF B, PARA 3) AND HE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOMETHING IN THIS VIEW. NYERERE TRUSTED THE US COMPLETELY NOW ON RHODESIA BUT HE CERTAINLY DID NOT WANT TO SEE OTHER GREAT POWERS APART FROM THE US COMING IN. THERE REALLY SHOULD BE A "JUSTIFICATION" FOR US COSPONSORSHIP OF THE CONFERENCE AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 DAR ES 01497 01 OF 02 121308Z

HE COULDN'T SEE IT. HE SUSPECTED THE UK WANTED US INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE FOR ITS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS.

5. NYERERE ENDED BY SAYING HE WOULD FEEL "MUCH HAPPIER" IF US WAS NOT FORMALLY INVOLVED IN CONFERENCE. THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD NOT LEND ITSELF TO BEING LABELLED A BRITISH-AMERICAN DOCUMENT. THE FACT OF US POWER WAS ESSENTIAL BUT IT COULD BEST BE USED IN THE BACKGROUND DURING THE CONFERENCE AND AS DIRECTLY AND FORCEFULLY AS NECESSARY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS. HE ADDED THAT HE "KNEW" MUGABE HAD NO OBJECTION TO US SUPPORT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE APPROACH, AS OPPOSED TO US FORMAL PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01497 02 OF 02 121316Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----121320Z 036198 /44

O 121135Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4653
INFO AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1497

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

6. IN TALKING ABOUT WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE MIGHT BE LIKE, NYERERE SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL ELEMENTS RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS, INCLUDING MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE, BUT AS LONG AS THE KEY QUESTION WAS GETTING RID OF SMITH, AND "THE FIGHTERS" WERE MAKING MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THAT, PATRIOTIC FRONT VIEWS WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE GIVEN "MORE WEIGHT" THAN THOSE OF OTHERS. AFTER A CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN DEVISED AND ELECTIONS HELD, THE SITUATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT. MUZOREWA OR SITHOLE MIGHT WELL WIN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. BUT THE POINT NYERERE HAD REPEATEDLY MADE TO OWEN WAS THAT IF APPROACH WORKED, A CEASE-FIRE WOULD BE ESSENTIAL, AND IT WAS ONLY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WHICH COULD EFFECT A CEASE-FIRE. HE, NYERERE, WAS MORE EAGER THAN ANYONE ELSE TO GET TO THAT POINT. HE WANTED TO BE ABLE STOP EXPENDING TANZANIA'S SCARCE RESOURCES IN TRAINING AND SUPPORTING THE FIGHTERS. HE WANTED TO SEE "THAT POOR COUNTRY, ZAMBIA" FINALLY GET A CHANCE TO DEVELOP. HE WANTED MOZAMBIQUE TO HAVE TIME TO THINK OF SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE RHODESIAN WAR.

7. NYERERE ALSO SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE OTHER POINT HE WORRIED ABOUT AND WANTED MAKE SURE US UNDERSTOOD HIS VIEWS. RICHARD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 01497 02 OF 02 121316Z

HAD ALWAYS TALKED AS IF HE SAW FUTURE ARMY OF RHODESIA AS SMITH'S PRESENT ARMY WITH PERHAPS FEW COOPTEES FROM FIGHTERS WITH REST OF LATTER BEING DISARMED. HE FEARED BRITISH MAY STILL BE THINKING SAME WAY IN PRESENT APPROACH. NYERERE'S AND AFRICAN VIEW IS REVERSE. NEW ARMY MUST BE NATIONALIST FIGHTERS, PERHAPS WITH SOME OF FORMER SMITH PEOPLE INCORPORATED. THIS

POINT COULD CAUSE TROUBLE, COULD NOT BE GLOSSED OVER, AND SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD FROM BEGINNING.

8. COMMENT: OWEN'S PARTY ASKED THAT I PASS TO UK HIGH COM-MISSIONER HERE THE RESULTS OF MY APPROACH TO NYERERE. I PROPOSE TO DO SO WITH EXCEPTION OF PARAS 4 AND 5 ABOVE, I.E., NYERERE'S RECOMMENDATION THAT US STEER CLEAR OF FORMAL PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCE WHILE SUPPORTING IT FULLY AND ACCEPTING MAJOR ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, AND REALIZING THAT I AM WORKING FROM AS NARROW A VIEWPOINT AS NYERERE, I THINK THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR HIS SUGGESTION.
SPAIN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 12-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977DARES01497
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770126-0702
Format: TEL
From: DAR ES SALAAM
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770467/aaaacfzy.tel
Line Count: 182
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: d94dbda6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 80483, 77 DAR ES SALAAM 1485
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2835706
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRESIDENT NYERERE'S COMMENTS ON UK FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN'S PRESENTATION ON RHODESIA
TAGS: PFOR, RH, TZ, UK, (NYERERE), (OWEN, DAVID)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/d94dbda6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009